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Abstract:
The goal of this research paper is to analyze accounting fraud and its characteristics,
explore the collapse of Enron and what happened because of it, and how the relationship between
an auditor and its client has changed because of the creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Learning about some of the positives and negatives of SOX will help the progression of the
research into how the passing of SOX has changed over 15 years later. After discussing these
topics, a personal opinion on the fall of Enron, if one group is more at fault than another, and
how regulation plays a role in auditing and the business world will conclude the paper.
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1. What is Fraud?
To understand how a major fraud case was able to occur, a solid foundation defining
fraud and its characteristics needs to be established. The Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners defines fraud as, “any crime for gain that uses deception as its principal modus
operandus” (ACFE, 2017). Although initially broad, fraud can be dissected further into internal
fraud, external fraud, and fraud against individuals. Internal fraud, which will be the focus of this
research paper, is also called occupational fraud. It involves an employee who uses their job for
personal gain or use through deliberate misappropriation of an employer’s resources or assets.
External fraud occurs outside of a company or a business. A vendor may attempt to rip-off a
buyer by increasing prices unfairly, threatening an employee, or bill a buyer for goods or
services that were not provided. Similarly, a customer could commit external fraud by returning
stolen goods for money or using false account information and bad checks. The ACFE concludes
external fraud’s definition by including these other forms of fraud: “hacking, theft of proprietary
information, tax fraud, bankruptcy fraud, insurance fraud, healthcare fraud, and loan fraud”
(ACFE, 2017). The final form of fraud listed by the ACFE is fraud against individuals. This
includes any type of identity theft, Ponzi-schemes, and phishing schemes.
In an annual study completed by the ACFE called the Report to the Nations on
Occupational Fraud and Abuse, domestic and international statistics regarding fraud are
examined and reviewed (Report to the Nations, 2016). This report uses information from almost
2,500 occupational fraud cases that were investigated between January 2014 and October 2015 in
114 different countries throughout the world. Some interesting facts from this report follow:
•

•

•

•

•

The median loss suffered by small organizations (those with fewer than 100
employees) was the same as that incurred by the largest organizations (those with
more than 10,000 employees). However, this type of loss is likely to have a much
greater impact on smaller organizations.
The perpetrator’s level of authority was strongly correlated with the size of the
fraud. The median loss in a scheme committed by an owner/executive was
$703,000. This was more than four times higher than the median loss caused by
managers ($173,000) and nearly 11 times higher than the loss caused by
employees ($65,000).
More occupational frauds originated in the accounting department (16.6%) than in
any other business unit. Of the frauds we analyzed, more than three-fourths were
committed by individuals working in seven key departments: accounting,
operations, sales, executive/upper management, customer service, purchasing, and
finance
The most prominent organizational weakness that contributed to the frauds in our
study was a lack of internal controls, which was cited in 29.3% of cases, followed
by an override of existing internal controls, which contributed to just over 20% of
cases.
Fraud perpetrators tended to display behavioral warning signs when they were
engaged in their crimes. The most common red flags were living beyond means,
financial difficulties, unusually close association with a vendor or customer,
excessive control issues, a general “wheeler-dealer” attitude involving
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unscrupulous behavior, and recent divorce or family problems. At least one of
these red flags was exhibited during the fraud in 78.9% of cases.
There are many different types of occupational fraud; however, by looking more closely
at employee fraud and embezzlement, examples provided later in the paper will be better
understood. Employee fraud is the use of fraudulent means to take money or other property from
an employer and consists of three phases: the fraudulent act, the conversion of the money or
property to the fraudster’s use, and the cover up. Embezzlement involves employees’ or
nonemployees’ wrongfully taking money entrusted in their care, custody, and control, often
accompanied by false accounting entries and other forms of lying and cover up (Louwers et al, p.
222). With so many ways an individual or a group of individuals can commit fraud, figuring out
what motivates a fraudster will facilitate this understanding.
1.1 The Fraud Triangle
Originally developed by American penologist, sociologist, and criminologist Donald
Cressey, the fraud triangle models the factors that cause someone to commit occupational fraud.
These three factors are defined in Cressey’s book Other People’s Money, “Trusted persons
become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as having a financial problem which is
non-shareable, are aware this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of
financial trust, and are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations which
enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of
themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property” (Cressey, p. 30). More simply, there
needs to be a motivation, an opportunity, and a rationalization of the illegal activity. By having
these three factors, fraud is highly likely to occur.
This motivation can stem from an economic motive, such as an actual or perceived need for
money, a psychotic motive, such as a criminal who steals for the sake of stealing, an egocentric
motive, such as someone who commits fraud for personal prestige, or an ideological motive,
such as a someone who believes they are morally superior and are justified in making others
victims. An opportunity to commit fraud mainly stems from weak internal controls, or the
controls within a company or business that serve as a checks and balances. Rationalization can
occur in many ways. One will make an argument to make the action seem as though it is in line
with their moral and ethical behavior. Examples of frequent rationalization include: I need it
more than the other person; I’m borrowing the money and will pay it back; everybody does it;
the company is big and will never miss it; nobody will get hurt; I am underpaid, so this is due
compensation; I need to maintain a lifestyle and image (Louwers et al, p. 228). Knowing the
factors that go into the fraud triangle is not the only way to detect fraud. Red flags and
characteristics of fraudsters allows us to create a profile for a prime suspect.
1.2 Who Commits Fraud
When unsure if there is a fraud being committed, an employer may take a step back and take
a look at his or her employees to note any red flags. Common red flags of fraudsters include:
sleeplessness, drinking too much, taking drugs, easily becoming irritable, unable to relax, easily
gets defensive, can’t look people in the eye, sweat excessively, goes to confession, finds excuses
and scapegoats for mistakes, works standing up, works alone, or frequently works late.
Characteristics of fraudsters can be defined by: has a post-high school education, is likely to be
4

married, is a member of a religious organization, is in the age range of teenager to over 60, is
socially conforming, has been employed from one to 20 years, does not have an arrest record,
and is usually acting alone (Louwers et al, p. 224).
Unfortunately, these descriptions of the typical fraudster do not alienate one specific type of
person, as most people in the work force can be described by most or all of these characteristics.
In a lot of fraud cases, people will say that they never expected the fraudster to commit the crime
and that they cannot believe it. Because of this ambiguity, other red flags which increase the
probability of fraud include management characteristics, industry condition, and operating
characteristics.
1.3 Risk Factors Related to Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Aside from the fraud triangle and common characteristics of fraudsters, multiple factors
increase the risk of fraud within an organization. Management’s characteristics strongly
influence how a company can be portrayed. Examples of management risk factors include: a
motivation to engage in fraudulent reporting, decisions are dominated by an individual or a small
group, lack of importance on internal control, aggressive attitude toward financial reporting, too
much emphasis on earnings projections, frequent disputes between managers and auditors, a
history of violations, a high turnover of senior management, and nonfinancial management
participates excessively in the selection of accounting principles or determination of estimates.
Another area which can create fraud risk are industry conditions. Rapid changes within the
industry, new requirements are passed which impair profitability, strong competition, and a
declining industry are all influences that could impact a company. Lastly, the way a company
operates can create a more fraud-prone environment. Weak internal controls, inexperienced
accounting personnel, significant transactions that are difficult to audit, and a pressure to obtain
capital are all characteristics within an organization which increase the risk of fraud. Although
there are many ways that fraud can occur, preventing fraud before it happens or detecting fraud
before it has a material impact is possible (Louwers et al, p. 228).
1.4 How Can Fraud be Prevented?
A good way to prevent fraud from occurring in the first place is to have a strong and ethical
tone at the top. A control environment which emulates following laws and procedures will have
that same trickle-down effect and will most likely create a less fraudulent atmosphere. Another
way to prevent fraud is to provide counseling services for employees. Life outside of work can
become a huge stressor for employees, so having an outlet for them to safely talk about what’s
going on allows an employee to feel less stressed and continue to do their job or receive
additional help if necessary. Having an anonymous hotline provides a way for employees to
inquire or inform an ethics officer or another controls employee about an event or transaction
that they are unsure about. Some people do not want to feel like they are telling on someone,
especially if that someone is your superior, so having an anonymous hotline eliminates the
possibility of feeling awkward or embarrassed (Louwers et al, p. 228).
Internal controls and employee monitoring are huge fraud prevention methods. Having easily
accessible company-wide procedures and rules allows employees to understand exactly what
they are supposed to do no matter what the situation is. Being able to monitor employees is also
another important method for preventing fraud: common red flags can inform a controls officer
5

whether an employee seems to be acting fishy. Other ways which internal control activities can
detect fraud include: segregation of duties and responsibilities for transaction authorization,
record keeping, custody of or access to assets, and reconciliation of actual assets to the
accounting records. Finally, having a checks and balances within the company creates an attitude
of accountability. Required background checks prior to hiring decreases the probability of hiring
someone who had issues with inappropriate or unethical behavior. A code of conduct, a list of
ways to properly act within the company in order to follow the correct procedures, is another
common way of reinforcing the importance of being accountable for your actions and having
integrity with your work.
1.5 How Can Fraud be Detected?
There are many ways fraud can be prevented; however, if prevention was unsuccessful, there
are other ways that fraud can be detected. Within a company, there is normally a group of
accountants who are internal auditors. Internal auditors must be independent and objective of a
company’s procedures. They provide assurance and consulting activities which adds value and
improves an organization’s operations. In order for a company to accomplish its goals, internal
auditors must audit business systems within the company to ensure that the company is on track
to complete its financial goals while following its code of conduct and business practices
(Louwers et al, p. 681). Internal auditors have many roles including: ensuring reliability and
integrity or information, safeguard assets, ensure compliance with policies and regulations,
achieve organizational objectives and goals, improve operational economy and efficiency,
identify business risk, and help prevent and detect fraud.
Internal auditors have four main principles of the Institute of Internal Auditors Code of
Ethics: integrity, objectivity, confidentiality, and competency (Institute of Internal Auditors,
2017). Integrity establishes trust that is the basis for reliance on their judgement. Objectivity
needs to be maintained in gathering, evaluating, and communicating information to adequately
balance the assessment of all the relevant circumstances while remaining uninfluenced by selfinterest or by others. Confidentiality is respecting the value and ownership of information.
Competency is applying the knowledge, skills, and experience needed in performance of internal
audit services. Finally, internal auditors must be in regular communication with external auditors
to coordinate audit activities.
External auditors are Certified Public Accountants, or CPAs, who work in accounting firms
and do an annual audit of the company at hand. To become a CPA, a student must complete 150
credit hours along with passing the CPA exam, which is divided into four parts. Those four parts
are Auditing & Attestation (AUD), Financial Accounting & Reporting (FAR), Regulation
(REG), and Business Environment & Concepts (BEC). After passing all four parts, accountants
are then officially CPAs and can work on audits as well as filing tax returns for individuals. They
work closely with the internal auditors and share the goal of accurately and fairly portraying that
company. External auditors need to maintain a healthy amount of professional skepticism, or a
questioning mindset towards representations made by management and evidential matter
gathered. Sufficient evidence must always be gathered because inquiry alone is never enough.
With annual audits come audit opinions. External auditors are required to issue an opinion
based on the evidence gathered and analyzed. The four types of opinions are: unqualified,
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financial statements are in conformity of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP);
qualified, except for limited items, financial statement is in conformity with GAAP; adverse,
financial statements are not in conformity with GAAP; disclaimer, auditors do not express an
opinion.
Major public accounting companies typically performed external audits for most
organizations. The opinion they did or did not give regarding the accuracy and fairness of an
organization’s financial statements allowed shareholders to decide how they wanted to invest in
that company. However, these opinions were not always true, accurate, or fair because of many
factors, including fraud.
2. The Enron Scandal
Enron, Corp. was a company with unbelievable growth and profits. With strong,
persuasive, and money-hungry executives leading the way, Enron evidently fell because of
financial statement fraud. At its best, Enron was trading at $90.75 per share. By the time they
declared bankruptcy at the end of 2001, shares were worth $0.67 each (Investopedia: Enron
Scandal Summary, 2017). Enron’s collapse impacted the lives of countless employees and
changed the way financial statements were presented forever. How Enron employees were able
to pull this off still amazes people today. However, with off-the-books transactions and
“aggressive” accounting, Enron fooled almost everyone into thinking that they were the best
company to come along. Knowing what kind of company Enron was is the first step to
understanding its ultimate demise.
2.1 What Was Enron
Enron Corporation was an energy company that resulted from a combination of two
companies. Initially, Enron was just a gas provider. “Enron was founded in 1985 by Kenneth Lay
in the merger of two natural-gas-transmission companies, Houston Natural Gas Corporation and
InterNorth, Inc.; the merged company, HNG InterNorth, was renamed Enron in 1986. After the
U.S. Congress adopted a series of laws to deregulate the sale of natural gas in the early 1990s,
the company lost its exclusive right to operate its pipelines (Britannica, 2016). Enron acted as an
intermediary between natural-gas producers and their customers, and by 1994 Enron began
trading electricity. With strong leadership from executives like Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling,
and Andrew Fastow, Enron was named Fortune’s “America’s Most Innovative Company” from
1996 to 2001 (Investopedia: Enron Scandal Summary, 2017).
2.2 Who Were the Key People Involved
The executive board of Enron Corporation was led by experienced leaders. First in line is
founder Kenneth Lay. Information about Lay and his career at Enron follows: “Kenneth Lee Lay
was born on April 15, 1942, in Tyrone, Missouri, and received both his bachelor and master
degrees in economics from the University of Missouri. With the military draft at its highest level,
Lay applied for Navy officer’s candidate school and was accepted. He served in the U.S. Navy
from 1968 to 1971 as an economist. In 1970, after earning a Ph.D. in economics at the University
of Houston, Lay worked as an energy deputy undersecretary for the United States Department of
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Interior until 1974. He then went to work for Exxon Corporation's predecessor, Humble Oil &
Refining. In 1974, Kenneth Lay joined the Florida Gas Company, eventually serving as president
of its successor company, Continental Resources Company. In 1981, he left Continental to join
Transco Energy Company in Houston, Texas. Three years later, Lay joined Houston Natural Gas
Co. as chairman and CEO. The company merged with InterNorth in 1985, and was later renamed
Enron Corp. In 1986, Kenneth Lay was appointed chairman and chief executive officer of
Enron” (Biography: Lay, 2016).
Jeffrey Skilling was appointed just below Lay. Working in the energy industry for the
length of his career, Skilling’s short biography follows: “Business executive Jeffrey Keith
Skilling was born on November 25, 1953, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The second of four
children, Jeffrey Skilling received his B.S. in applied science from Southern Methodist
University in 1975 and his M.B.A. from Harvard in 1979. Upon graduation, he worked for
McKinsey & Company in their energy and chemical consulting practices. In 1990, Skilling was
hired away from McKinsey by Kenneth Lay to work at Enron Corporation. Skilling was named
chairman and chief executive officer of Enron Finance Corporation and became the chairman of
Enron Gas Services Company in 1991. In 1997, he was promoted to president and chief
operating officer. In that capacity, Skilling pushed an aggressive investment strategy, helping
make Enron the biggest wholesaler of gas and electricity, with $27 billion traded in a quarter. He
was named CEO of Enron, replacing Lay, in 2001” (Biography: Skilling, 2014).
Andrew Fastow worked closely with Skilling and Lay. Former CFO of Enron, some more
background on Fastow: “With a B.A., Chinese and economics, Tufts University, 1983; M.B.A.,
Northwestern University, 1986, Fastow Started his career at the Continental Bank in Chicago
and moved to Enron in 1990. Named CFO in March 1998. Fastow reportedly came up with the
innovative financing scheme that moved debts and assets off the books and into the Enronrelated partnerships that the CFO had for his family, his neighborhood and even Star Wars
characters. The company forced Fastow to resign on Oct. 24, 2001” (Forbes, 2002).
The large accounting firm Arthur Andersen was Enron’s financial advisory and
consulting for the length of its existence. Arthur Andersen was one of the “Big Eight” accounting
firms which also included Arthur Young, Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Ernst and Whinney, Peat
Marwick Mitchell, Price Waterhouse, Touche Ross, and Coopers and Lybrand. Arthur Andersen
took care of Enron’s tax work, auditing, and consulting and was led through by Richard Causey.
A short biography about Causey follows: “Richard A. Causey was executive vice president and
chief accounting officer of Enron. Previously, Mr. Causey was a managing director of Enron
Capital & Trade Resources (ECT) with responsibility for the development of ECT's core retail
energy products. Other areas of responsibility at ECT included accounting and risk management
operations, as well as the leadership of treasury activities (capital markets, portfolio management
and transaction evaluation). Mr. Causey was also a member of Enron's Management Committee.
Before joining Enron, Mr. Causey was a senior manager with Arthur Anderson & Co. in Houston
where he specialized in the natural gas industry. While at Arthur Anderson, he had primary
responsibility for the Enron engagement as well as other natural gas pipeline and marketing
clients” (APFN, 2002).
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2.3 The Collapse of Enron
Enron had a humble beginning with a reported loss of $14 million in its first year in 1986
(Thibodeau and Freier, p. 178). However, with a strong stake in the energy business and
involvement in three major stages of the supply chain of natural gas: production, transmission,
and distribution, Enron began a series of cost-cutting actions, such as layoffs and selling assets to
reduce debt. As previously mentioned, Enron was formed in the middle of huge regulation
changes in the industry. With deregulation in process, the government hoped to create more
transparent access to energy from energy companies. Enron began to adapt to this new industry
policies in their own way.
This allowed Enron to engage in more risky business deals with gas companies. For
example, “in 1988, Enron signed a 15-year contract with Brooklyn Union to supply gas to a plant
being built in New York. Because Brooklyn Union was not connected to Enron’s pipeline
system, Enron needed to contract with another pipeline company to transport the gas to Brooklyn
Union. Enron was therefore assuming added risks related to the transportation of the gas. The
long-term nature of the contract was also risky because prices could rise to a level that would
make the contract unprofitable” (Thibodeau and Freier, p. 178).
Enron recorded profits of the difference between the prices of how much they bought the
gas for and how much they sold it for. However, it was becoming difficult to get more long-term
contracts signed by gas producers. To help reduce this issue, Enron began giving these producers
cash up front as opposed to payment over the life of the contracts. After completing these deals,
Enron would then allow those negotiated contracts to be traded. This method of trading gas
contracts would quickly become the outline which Enron would model each market it was
involved in. Enron’s new strategy proved to be an easy way to have very little assets on the
books and to achieve its goal of, “achieving the advantages of a presence in the physical market
without the disadvantages of huge fixed capital expenditures” (Thibodeau and Freier, p. 179). By
slowly eliminating its ownership of gas pipelines, Enron was able to expand in other places.
Enron looked internationally to start more projects. In 1993, Enron established the Enron
International division with facilities in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, India, China, and Central
and South America, which did not adhere to the same strategies that were following in the U.S.
Another area which facilities grew into was the broadband network, which is the use of fiber
optics to transmit audio and video.
As Enron continued to expand and change its business model, it began to change its
accounting procedures. One example of a change is the establishment of multiple special purpose
entity. A special purpose entity is, “an entity – partnership, corporation, trust, or joint venture –
created for a limited purpose, with limited activities and a limited life. A company forms an SPE
so outside investors are assured that they will only be exposed to only the risk of the SPE and its
particular purpose, such as building a gas pipeline, and not the risks associated with the entire
company. In addition, SPE also protects the investment of outside investors by giving them
control over its activities” (Thibodeau and Freier, p. 180).
Special purpose entities also allowed companies to separately report assets and liabilities
of the SPE and the main corporation, and it could record gains and losses from transactions of
9

the SPE. Two conditions had to be met in order for this recognition to take place: “an owner
independent of the company had to own a ‘substantive’ equity interest (at least 3 percent of the
SPE’s assets, and that 3 percent remain at risk through the transaction), and the independent
owner had to exercise control of the SPE” (Thibodeau and Freier, p. 180). This regulation was
specifically controversial because most consolidation rules required a standard of 50 percent
indirect or direct ownership in order to record any gains or losses. Therefore, this deregulated
standard made it easier for companies to use SPEs for fraudulent purposes, such as hiding debt
by keeping it off of the organization’s balance sheet and putting it on the SPEs balance sheet.
Enron quickly took advantage of this new standard with the formation of an SPE with the
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) in 1993. The $500 million 50-50
partnership was named Joint Energy Development Investments Limited (JEDI) allowed Enron
not to consolidate the partnership with Enron’s own financial statements because they did not
have over 50 percent ownership. “In 1997, Enron offered to buy out CalPERS’s interest in JEDI.
To maintain as an unconsolidated entity, Enron needed to identify a new limited partner”
(Thibodeau and Freier, p. 180). Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow decided to create a new
SPE called Chewco Investments. Chewco would have a majority of its equity investments come
from third-party investors. However, Chewco was unable to obtain outside equity, so it had a
new structure. A $250 million unsecured loan from Barclays Bank (guaranteed by Enron), a
$132 million advance from JEDI to Chewco through a revolving credit agreement, and $11.5
million (approximately 3 percent) in equity from Chewco’s general and limited partners made up
Chewco’s capital structure.
Chewco’s general partner was Michael Kopper, an Enron employee who reported directly
to Fastow. The explanation of the limited partner of Chewco was a bit more complicated. An
entity called Big River Funding, LLC, was the limited partner for Chewco; however, they only
had one member which was an entity called Little River Funding LLC. “Kopper had invested
$115,000 in Big River and $10,000 in Little River but transferred these investments to William
Dodson. As such, Kopper technically had no interest in Chewco’s limited partner. The remaining
$11.4 million was provided by Barclays Bank in the form of equity loans to Big River and Little
River” (Thibodeau and Freier, p. 181). Essentially, a majority of the funding for this SPE deal
was from Barclays Bank. Because of this complicated transaction, Enron’s auditor Arthur
Andersen required that Enron provide all documentation regarding the Chewco transaction.
Andersen received little documentation from Enron regarding the Chewco transaction.
Among what they did receive included confirmation regarding the loan agreement from a
Chewco representative. Andersen then requested that Enron provide documents related to the
structure and formation of Chewco. However, Enron told Andersen, “that it did not have these
documents and could not obtain them because Chewco was a third party with its own legal
counsel and ownership independent of Enron” (Thibodeau and Freier, p. 182). When Andersen
reviewed these documents, they decided that Chewco should have been consolidated with
Enron’s financial statements because there was not enough outside equity. Therefore, a
retroactive consolidation of Chewco caused a decrease in Enron’s net income: $28 million out of
$105 million total in 1997, $133 million out of $703 million total in 1998, $153 million out of
$893 million total in 1999, and $91 million out of $979 million total in 2000 (Thibodeau and
Freier, p. 182).
10

As Enron continued to change their structure with SPEs, they also lobbied the SEC
regarding the use of mark-to-market (MTM) accounting. Wanting to use this method for its
trading business, MTM, “allowed the present value, rather than the actual value which was used
in its original natural gas business, of a stream of future inflows and expenses under a contract to
be recognized as revenues and expenses, respectively, once the contract was signed” (Thibodeau
and Freier, p. 183). The SEC’s chief accounting Walter Sheutz allowed Enron to use this method
in the first quarter of its fiscal year ended December 31, 1992. He emphasized that this method
was only to be used in Enron’s natural gas trading business. In response to the SEC, Enron’s
CFO at the time, Jack Tompkin, wrote back, “Enron has changed its method of accounting for its
energy related, price-risk management activities effective January 1, 1991… the cumulative
effect of initial adoption of mark-to-market accounting, as well as the impact on the 1991
earnings is not material” (Thibodeau and Freier, p. 183).
The first contract which Enron used MTM accounting with was an agreement for Enron
to supply Sithe Energies with 195 million cubic feet of gas per day for 20 years for a plant that
Sithe Energies was planning to build in New York. The value of this gas was estimated at $3.5 to
$4 billion. Before MTM, Enron would have recorded the actual costs and actual revenues.
However, using MTM meant that once Enron and Sithe Energies signed this contract, Enron
could book the present value of both the expenses and revenues. Any change in value was
recognized as an additional income or as a loss. The SEC had only allowed Enron to use this
method for one area of their business: natural gas for contracts. Enron decided it would use this
method for all areas of their business. Two instances illustrate their use of MTM accounting:
“Enron signed a 15-year $1.3 billion deal to supply electricity to Eli Lilly. Enron calculated the
present value of the contract at more than $500 million and recognized this amount as revenue…
Enron signed a 20-year agreement with Blockbuster Video in July 2000 to introduce
entertainment on demand. Enron set up pilot projects in Portland, Seattle, and Salt Lake City to
store the entertainment and distribute it over its broadband network. Based on these pilot
projects, Enron recognized estimated profits of more than $110 million for the Blockbuster deal”
(Thibodeau and Freier, p. 184).
In order to account for these transactions, Enron had Arthur Andersen as their external
auditor. However, Andersen had also been performing Enron’s internal audit function since
1993. Enron was very dependent on Andersen and had fees for auditing, business consulting, and
tax work for $48.6 million in 1999, $58 million in 2000, and over $50 million in 2001. It is safe
to say that Enron was one of Andersen’s largest clients. The SEC tried to step in to reform the
industry practice of an audit firm also providing consulting and tax services. Enron’s Chair and
CEO Kenneth Lay sent a letter to SEC Chair Arthur Levitt saying, “While the agreement Enron
has with its independent auditors displaces a significant portion of the activities previously
performed by internal resources, it is structures to ensure that Enron management maintains
appropriate audit plan design, results assessment, and overall monitoring and oversight
responsibilities… Enron has found its ‘integrated audit’ arrangement to be more efficient and
cost effective than the more traditional roles of separate internal and external auditing functions”
(Thibodeau and Freier, p. 185).
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Andersen employees relied on their ability to sell other services to their clients to receive
individual compensation. This meant that non-audit services provided to Enron had a huge
impact on the salary for the lead Andersen partner. David Duncan, the lead Andersen partner,
and Richard Causey, Enron’s Chief Accounting Officer, developed a very strong relationship and
worked together a lot. Causey, having previously worked at Andersen after moving to Enron in
1991, had continuously hired Andersen accountants, some having made their way to executive
positions. Even with an office in Houston, Andersen insisted on having an entire floor in Enron’s
building in Texas. Duncan enjoyed this close relationship with his client because of his ability to
serve his client better. Some Andersen accountants recalled how they felt while working at the
Enron building: “We basically do the same types of things… we’re trying to kinda cross lines
and trying to, you know, become more of just a business person here at Enron; Being here fulltime, year-round day-to-day gives us a chance to chase the deals with them and participate in the
deal making process” (Thibodeau and Freier, p. 186). Andersen and Enron had a very close
relationship and often went on company trips together to go skiing, had parties at work, and
played fantasy football on each other’s computers.
Enron continued their method of creating SPEs, and in 1999, Enron’s CFO Fastow spoke
to Duncan about a plan to create another SPE called LJM to finance a vehicle used to access
capital or increase leverage without adding debt to a firm’s balance sheet. Duncan was unable to
come to a conclusion after reviewing the necessary documents, and he asked for the advice from
a professional standards group (PSG). Benjamin Neuhasen represented the PSG and emphasized
his disapproval in an email to Duncan on May 28, 1999, “Setting aside accounting, (the) idea of
a venture equity managed by CFO is terrible from a business point of view… Conflicts of
interest galore. Why would any director in his or her right mind ever approve such a scheme?”
(Thibodeau and Freier, p. 186). The PSG continued to disagree with this method of accounting,
but Duncan reported to Fastow that Andersen would approve of the creation of the new SPE
based on a few conditions: receiving the approval from Enron’s CEO and its board of directors.
Carl Bass became the new representative of the PSG in December 1999 and he agreed
with Neuhasen’s opinion. Bass wrote to his boss John Stewart, “This is a big item and the team
apparently does not want to go back to the client on this. I think at a minimum the Practice
Director needs to be made aware of this history and our opposition to the accounting”
(Thibodeau and Freier, p. 187). Even after this email was sent, Bass’s opposition remained
ignored by Duncan. Later in 2000, Bass went to Duncan again for some advice on how to
account for some Enron SPEs. Enron wished to lump together the financial results from each of
the four entities in the SPE called Raptors, but Bass disagreed. However, when Bass repeated his
opposition to Duncan, Duncan continued to ignore Bass and decided that Andersen would,
“accept the client’s position with some modifications” (Thibodeau and Freier, p. 187). In early
2001, an annual risk assessment meeting was held by Andersen in order to determine whether or
not to keep Enron as a client. After some partners voiced their concerns regarding, “how much
debt Enron was not putting on its balance sheet, Fastow’s conflict of interest, and the lack of
disclosure in the company’s financial footnotes,” Duncan reiterated that there were no issues
(Thibodeau and Freier, p. 187).
Interestingly, Bass was removed from the Enron account in March 2001. In an email to
his boss, Bass wrote, “‘Apparently, part of the process issue stems from the client (Enron)
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knowing all that goes on within our walls on our discussions with respect to their issues… we
should not be communicating with the client that so and so said this and I could not get this past
so and so in the PSG… I have also noted that on this engagement that the question is usually
couched along the lines ‘will the PSG support this?’ When a call starts out that way, it is my
experience that the partner is struggling with the question and what the client wants to do’”
(Thibodeau and Freier, p. 188). Just after this email, Bass’s boss reached out to a senior partner
and complained about Bass’s removal. The reasoning for Bass’s removal seemed uncanny:
Duncan later called and explained that Enron executives Richard Causey and John Echols really
pushed for Bass’s removal.
2.4 The Effect
Just before Bass was removed from the Enron account, Enron went under a huge
executive change in February 2001. Kenneth Lay announced his retirement and appointed
Jeffrey Skilling as CEO. Skilling readily took the reins: “In February Skilling held the
company’s annual conference with analysts, bragging that the stock (then valued around $80)
should be trading at around $126 per share” (Journal of Accountancy, 2002). Shortly after
Skilling assumed the CEO position, Enron called off a deal it had with Blockbuster. By the time
March came around, Enron stock had fallen to the mid-$60s (Journal of Accountancy, 2002). As
if things were no getting bad enough, Enron the spring and summer brought more news of
Enron’s shortcomings because of poor performances in risky deals. This evidently led to a cash
shortage, which signaled to senior management that things were not looking good. Eventually,
“Senior management, which had been voting with its feet since August 2000, selling Enron stock
in the bull market, continued to exit, collectively hundreds of millions of dollars richer for the
experience” (Journal of Accountancy, 2002). Two major turning points for Enron occurred in
August: after being appointed CEO just 6 months prior, Skilling resigned from the position for
“personal reasons,” and an Enron employee brought to the attention of a Vice President the
danger that Enron was in. “In an internal memorandum to Lay, a company vice-president,
Sherron Watkins, described her reservations about the lack of disclosure of the substance of the
related party transactions with the SPEs run by Fastow. She concluded the memo by stating her
fear that the company might “implode under a series of accounting scandals.” Lay notified the
company’s attorneys, Vinson & Elkins, as well as the audit partner at Enron’s auditing firm,
Arthur Andersen LLP, so the matter could be investigated further” (Journal of Accountancy,
2002). A few months later, Enron underwent many changes which were huge red flags.
Within one week in October 2001, Enron was truly at the end of its course. On October
16, Enron announcing its first quarterly loss because of poorly performing business which caused
a $1 billion charge. On this same day, Enron, “disclosed the reversal of the $1.2 billion entry to
assets and equities it had made as a result of dealings with these arrangements. It was this
disclosure that got the SEC’s attention” (Journal of Accountancy, 2002). Just one day later,
Enron announced that it would be changing its employee’s 401(k) plans, therefore making it
impossible for employees to sell their Enron stock because of locking the investments for 30 day
periods. This event caught the attention of investors and solidified suspicions of Enron’s true
status. To top off such a big week for Enron, the company announced that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was investigating transactions between the company and the
partnerships owned by Fastow, who was fired just 2 days earlier. Shortly after, “On November 8
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Enron announced a restatement of its financial statements back to 1997 to reflect consolidation
of the SPEs it had omitted, as well as to book Andersen’s recommended adjustments from those
years, which the company had previously ‘deemed immaterial.’ This restatement resulted in
another $591 million in losses over the four years as well as an additional $628 million in
liabilities as of the end of 2000. The equity markets immediately reacted to the restatement,
driving the stock price to less than $10 a share” (Journal of Accountancy, 2002). With a pending
merger with competitor Dynergy scheduled for November 9, Enron continuously sunk in value,
causing Dynergy to rescind its offer because of Enron’s lack of balance sheet disclosures. With a
final push burying Enron, the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy can be defined by: “generally filed by corporations that require time to
restructure their debts, and it gives the debtor a fresh start, subject to the debtor's fulfillment of
his obligations under the plan of reorganization” (Investopedia: Chapter 11, 2017).
The SEC quickly responded to Enron’s collapse; however, it was characterized as too
little, too late. On December 11, SEC chairman Harvey Pitt gave his opinion in a piece in the
Wall Street Journal stating, “the current outdated reporting and financial disclosure system the
financial ‘perfect storm…’ under the current quarterly and annual reporting system, information
is often stale on arrival and mandated financial disclosures are often ‘arcane and impenetrable’”
(Journal of Accountancy, 2002). In an effort to reassure investors and to restore confidence in
financial reporting, Pitt called for a response from CEOs of large and regional accounting firms
to work together to achieve the following goals (Journal of Accountancy, 2002):
• A system of “current” disclosures, supplementing and updating quarterly and annual
information with disclosure of material information on a real-time basis.
• Public company disclosure of significant current “trend” and “evaluative” data in
addition to historical information.
• Identification of “most critical accounting principles” by all public companies in their
annual reports.
• More timely and responsive accounting standard setting on the part of the private sector.
• An environment of cooperation between the SEC and registrants that encourages public
companies and their auditors to seek advice on disclosure issues in advance.
• An effective and transparent system of self-regulation for the accounting profession,
subject to SEC’s rigorous, but nonduplicative, oversight.
• More proactive oversight by audit committees who understand financial accounting
principles as well as how they are applied.
Arthur Andersen was also taking a lot of heat from the SEC because of its involvement in
Enron’s downfall. When there was word that the SEC was looking into investigating Enron and
its financial statements, Andersen partners and Enron executives decided that the best way to
deal with the issue was to shred thousands of documents and emails pertaining to the financial
reporting and accounting methods of Enron and Andersen. In a Wall Street Journal article from
January 16, 2002, reports recounted the description given by Andersen:
“Andersen said in its statement: ‘The effort [to destroy documents] was initiated
following an urgent meeting the lead partner called on Oct. 23 to organize the expedited
effort to dispose of Enron-related documents. This meeting occurred shortly after the lead
partner learned that Enron had received a request for information from the [Securities and
Exchange Commission] about its financial accounting and reporting. This effort was
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undertaken without any consultation with others in the firm and at a time when the
engagement team should have had serious questions about their actions. Nothing in an Oct.
12 e-mail, almost two weeks earlier, or so far as we know, other conversations around that
time, authorized this activity.’ The firm added that the document destruction ‘appears to have
ended shortly after the lead partner's assistant sent an e-mail to other secretaries on Nov. 9 -the day after Andersen received a subpoena from the SEC -- telling them to 'stop the
shredding.'’ By that time, huge volumes of e-mails and written documents had been
destroyed. Andersen said, ‘These activities were on such a scale and of such a nature as to
remove any doubt that Andersen's policies and reasonable good judgment were violated’”
(Brown et al, 2002).
From beginning and growing into one of the nation’s largest accounting firms, Andersen
began to battle more and more civil suits prior to the Enron scandal. However, after pleading
guilty to being involved in shredding and falsifying of Enron’s financial statements, Andersen
voluntarily ceased operations in August 2002. Because Andersen was responsible for the audits
of over 2,000 public companies, its collapse would wreak havoc on the rest of the major
accounting firms, known as the Big Five, which consisted of Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Deloitte,
KPMG, and Ernst & Young (ABC News, 2002).
3. The Response from the Accounting World
The Enron scandal not only impacted the lives of ex-employees from both Enron and
Andersen, but also forced a change within the accounting world and how financial reporting is
now conducted by public accounting firms. This, along with other major corporate frauds which
were committed by organizations such as WorldCom and Tyco, prompted the creation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael Oxley in
order to cut down the occurrence of corporate fraud.
3.1 What is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was created as a response to the increase in corporate
fraud that was being committing in the 1990s and early 2000s. This act that was passed by
Congress aims as protecting investor’s and their money by:
• “closing loopholes in recent accounting practices
• strengthening corporate governance rules
• increasing accountability and disclosure requirements of corporations, especially
corporate executives, and corporation's public accountants
• increasing requirements for corporate transparency in reporting to shareholders and
descriptions of financial transactions
• strengthening whistle-blower protections and compliance monitoring
• increasing penalties for corporate and executive malfeasance
• authorizes the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight board to further
monitor corporate behavior, especially in the area of accounting” (Peavler, 2017).
Another important change which SOX implemented was a yearly report on internal controls
within the company in an effort to reduce collusion between the company and the auditors.
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Finally, SOX also addresses requirements for information technology (IT) regarding electronic
records. SOX does not have set business practices for IT but instead, “defines which company
records need to be stored on file and for how long. It does not specify how a business should
store its records, only that the IT department is responsible for storing them, according to
standards outlined in the SOX Act” (Investopedia: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2015).
There are two key provisions within SOX that deal with security regulations and financial
reporting. The first, SOX Section 302 titled Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports, deals
with senior management certifying the validity of the financial statements of that company. In
summary from the SEC website documentation of SOX, Section 302 requires that the executive
officers of the company or organization certify that the signing officer has reviewed the report,
has read the report and understood that there is not any, “untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading,” and that the report
fairly represents the company (SEC: Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 2002). In addition, Section
302 also outlines the responsibilities of the signing officers by stating that they are responsible
for maintaining and implementing internal controls, have created effective internal controls to
detect any material information within that reporting period, have properly evaluated those
internal controls, have reported on the effectiveness of those internal controls based on their
evaluation, and have reported on a significant changes within the company’s internal controls or
any changes that would impact the company’s internal controls including any report of
deficiencies and material weaknesses (SEC: Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 2002). The second,
SOX Section 404 titled Management Assessment of Internal Controls, addresses the necessity of
internal controls within a company along with a report evaluating the effectiveness in the annual
report. In summary, a company must have internal controls and must report on those internal
controls. The report must address the responsibilities of management to maintain the proper
internal controls structure and procedures for financial reporting, supply an assessment of those
internal controls and how effective they were for that reporting period, and the public accounting
firm that is auditing that company must also report on the company’s internal controls and its
effectiveness (SEC: Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 2002).
These two sections are important to stopping fraud in other major ways. Firstly, SOX
created a new level auditing regulators: the PCAOB, or the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board. The PCAOB is, “a nonprofit corporation established by Congress to oversee
the audits of public companies in order to protect investors and the public interest by promoting
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports. The PCAOB also oversees the audits of
brokers and dealers, including compliance reports filed pursuant to federal securities laws, to
promote investor protection” (PCAOB, 2017). The PCAOB’s main job is to make sure that the
firms that are auditing a company are not also doing consulting business as well. This allows the
auditing firm to remain independent and therefore increase compliance with the standards
defined in SOX. Another way that sections 302 and 404 limit fraudulent behavior is through the
standard of having an independent auditor review and report on the company’s internal controls.
By having the internal auditing department working with the external auditors, compliance is
increased. Finally, SOX provides protection for whistleblowers. In the Enron scandal, it is hard
to believe that no one wanted to or tried to stop the fraud from occurring. If they had security
from the possibility of being fired or ostracized, things may have turned out differently. SOX
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protects, “employees that report fraud and testify in court against their employers. Companies are
not allowed to change the terms and conditions of their employment. They can't reprimand,
fire or blacklist the employee” (Peavler, 2017).
3.2 The Positives of Sarbanes-Oxley
Because of the large implementations that occurred from SOX, the corporate world
changed a lot. What once was an environment with little internal checks and balances is now a
setting which emphasizes fact checking, accuracy, and transparency. Investors have access to so
much more financial information regarding the companies and organizations that they invest in.
However, because of the requirement of internal controls, independent external auditors, and
protection of employees and whistleblowers, there has been some backlash from the
implementation of SOX.
One major provision from the adoption of SOX in the corporate world is the role that
auditors play in a company. Independence between the auditor and the company being audited is
regarded as most important and therefore leads to restrictions for the auditor. An auditor is not
allowed to provide a client with consulting and non-audit work simultaneously: “Bookkeeping or
other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client;
financial information systems design and implementation; appraisal or valuation services,
fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; actuarial services; internal audit outsourcing
services; management functions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment adviser, or
investment banking services; legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; any other
service that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board determines, by regulation, is
impermissible” (Bumgardner, 2010). Another regulation which increases auditor independence is
the SEC requiring that the lead audit partners for a company switch every five years so that the
possibility of fraud is decreased.
A group which gained more power from the passing of SOX is the audit committee. An
audit committee is, “an operating committee of a company's board of directors that is in charge
of overseeing financial reporting and disclosure. All U.S. publicly-traded companies must
maintain a qualified audit committee in order to be listed on a stock exchange. Committee
members must be made up of independent outside directors, including a minimum of one person
who qualifies as a financial expert” (Investopedia: Audit Committee, 2010). The audit committee
has new duties including, “pre-approve numerous audit and non-audit services, although in many
instances they may do so by putting in place policies and procedures to be followed rather than
actually reviewing each decision. Auditors must communicate to the audit committee all ‘critical
accounting policies’ and any discussions of ‘material accounting alternatives’ that may affect
how results are reported” (Bumgardner, 2010).
CEOs and directors have a larger responsibility to not only the company, but also to its
investors. Requiring that executives certify the accuracy of financial reports creates a larger
punishment for those CEOs who do not do so. For example, if an executive knowingly certifies
false reports, they are subject to up to 10 years in prison, and up to 20 years if an executive
willfully certifies false reports (Bumgardner, 2010). Basically, SOX makes it more difficult for
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those executives who had committed securities law violations previously to be in that position at
another company.
The increased cost that companies are facing can be attributed to the increased time and
effort required to meet the SOX regulations. Although this may seem like auditors are doing this
just for more money, “investors should welcome the increased scrutiny of financial statements.
Anything that puts the auditor into a more inquisitive, independent mode will increase investor
confidence in the capital markets” (Ciesielski and Weirich, 2006).
Additionally, a past PCAOB board member, Steven Harris, discussed the reasons why SOX
should not be repealed. Among reasons previously stated, Harris emphasized one major positive,
“It restored investor confidence. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was not just a response to Enron
despite the failures its collapse exposed. As the Los Angeles Times reported January 26, 2002,
less than two months after Enron filed for bankruptcy: ‘There was a total failure by everyone, a
complete breakdown in the system, in all the checks and balances. It was a failure by Wall Street
analysts who just went along for the ride, and by the auditors who were collecting so much
money they couldn't walk away from it, and by government agencies who are supposed to
monitor those companies…’ In July 2002 alone, the Dow dropped over 15 percent. And between
the time the House passed its bill in April and the Senate acted in July, the Dow declined almost
23 percent, or over 2,000 points. If nothing else, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act stopped cold the stock
market hemorrhage at the time” (Harris, 2012).
With some opponents of SOX stating that the increased regulations would increase
companies leaving the U.S economy, proponents have a different perspective. A contributor to a
LexisNexis website reflects, “The Act’s critics also have contended that the Act would ‘increase
the marginal cost of being a U.S.-registered public company more than the benefits of the status,’
which in turn, it was predicted, would lead to more companies going private or going dark, fewer
companies going public, and loss of listings to exchanges outside of the U.S. However, the
authors found that the research to date showed that ‘while smaller, less liquid and more fraudprone firms did indeed exit U.S. stock markets after SOX,’ the evidence that SOX reduced the
number of IPOs is ‘weak at best, and is offset by evidence that IPO pricing improved.’ The firms
that have gone private or gone dark typically are very small, with market capitalizations
generally under $30 million, and in fact going private trends in the U.K. ‘were similar to those in
the U.S. after SOX’” (LaCroix, 2014). The author goes on to discuss the general criticism of
upper management being opposed to changing their ways in order to adopt the regulations SOX
outline: “The authors also found that the results of various surveys about SOX stand in
interesting contrast to the frequent criticisms of the Act. The authors found after a review of
various surveys of corporate officials and investors that ‘contrary to the vehement criticisms of
SOX,’ the views of SOX among those most affected by its provisions ‘has been far more
nuanced, even receptive,’ producing among other things a higher level of confidence in
companies’ financial reporting” (LaCroix, 2014).
Although the initial cost of structuring a company for SOX compliance may be more costly
than expected, public accounting firms which audit those companies have come up with way that
make it simpler to ensure those regulations are being met. For example, the Big Four accounting
firm PricewaterhouseCoopers has outlined what they describe the “five attributes of SOX
excellence: Improved quality – of the overall program and Internal Controls over Financial
reporting, in line with most recent regulatory expectations; Reduced level of effort – by
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balancing cost through conscious decisions around strategy, structure, people, processes and
technology; Enhanced reliability – increasing the use of management’s work by the independent
auditor from enhanced competence and objectivity of testing; Increased alignment – of
organizational governance, risk and compliance efforts; Talent redeployment – from compliance
activities to more strategic business priorities” (PwC, 2017). By applying this method to their
clients and their financial statements, PwC aims at making the transition, or continuously
applying SOX regulations smooth for each of their clients.
3.3 The Negatives of Sarbanes-Oxley
There are many critics of SOX and how it has changed the corporate world. A contributor
to the website MarketWatch explains why he believes it should be exterminated in an article
from 2007: “I tell people that Sarbanes-Oxley should be called by its real name, ‘The public
accountant and auditor's protection act of 2002…’ Well the fallout from MCI and Enron and
other companies showed that the auditors were apparently not doing their jobs well enough to
prevent the mishaps. Sarbanes-Oxley keeps them from getting in trouble by mostly taking them
out of the loop they are supposed to monitor” (Dvorak, 2007).
The biggest negative with the passing of SOX in 2002 is in the increased cost which
companies must pay to receive accounting services from firms. Recounted from a CPA Journal
Article, some initial cost changes within the first few years SOX which were being implemented
are explained below:
•

•

•

•

“Between 2001 and 2004, total audit and audit-related fees increased 103% for 496 of the
S&P 500 companies. The fees increased 41% in 2004 alone. (Throughout this article,
only 496 of the S&P 500 companies’ audit fees were examined. Four entities—Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, Interpublic, and News Corporation—were excluded due to a lack of
available 2004 information.)
Fees for tax services that auditors provided to their clients increased 28% over the same
timeframe; however, total tax-related fees have decreased each year since 2002. All other
fees, which formerly included fees for financial reporting systems and design
engagements (now prohibited), dropped from about $2.3 billion in 2001 to about $100
million in 2004. Audit fee increases made up the difference.
Smaller companies in the S&P 500 had the bigger percentage change in audit fees. Audit
fees as a percent of revenues have increased, but not to a great degree. For the 50
companies demonstrating the biggest effect, the median increase in the ratio was only
17% between 2001 and 2004.
Expressed as an after-tax per-share amount, audit fees were $0.03 or less per share for
93% of the firms in the S&P 500. The average 2004 audit fee for S&P 500 companies has
more than doubled since 2001. Over the same timeframe, audit fees have increased to
82% of auditors’ total fees (41% in 2001). Clearly, auditing firms are doing more
auditing work than before” (Ciesielski and Weirich, 2006).

More recent information regarding how audit fees have changed over time provide us with a
better understanding of how SOX has changed the corporate world after 10 years of being
implemented. With economical events, such as the recovery from the 2008 recession, along with
business mergers and acquisitions, SOX has had to undergo some alterations and additions in
order to move along with the changing business world. Nevertheless, a similar complaint
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regarding how SOX has changed corporations nation-wide remains the same: increased cost. The
Journal of Accountancy explains how these numbers have increased, “More than one-third
(38%) of companies reported that SOX compliance costs rose year-over-year in 2012, while just
one in 10 said these costs decreased. But companies said on average that the costs for SOX
compliance are not extraordinarily high relative to the objective of quality financial reporting
through improved internal controls” (Tysiac, 2013). In order to meet these compliance
regulations, companies are altering the way that they conduct their processes so that they can
increase effectiveness and eventually drive down costs.
A contributor to Forbes also aired his opinion in an article from 2008. He explains that SOX
is unnecessary, harmful, and inadequate, “Unnecessary--because the stock exchanges had
already implemented most of the SOX changes in the rules of corporate governance in their new
listing standards, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had full authority to approve
and enforce accounting standards, the requirement that CEOs certify the financial statements of
their firms and the rules for corporate disclosure…Harmful--because SOX substantially increases
the risks of serving as a corporate officer or director, the premiums for directors and officers
liability insurance and the incentives, primarily for foreign and small firms, not to list their stock
on an American exchange. The ban on loans to corporate officers eliminates one of the more
efficient instruments of executive compensation. And SOX may also reduce the incentive of
corporate executives and directors to seek legal advice…Inadequate--because SOX failed to
identify and correct the major problems of accounting, auditing, taxation and corporate
governance that have invited corporate malfeasance and increased the probability of bankruptcy”
(Niskanen, 2008). Later in the article, the author states that Congress should at least clarify the
criminal penalties underlined in SOX as well as getting rid of the PCAOB and, “amending SOX
to shift the authority to select, monitor and compensate the independent public auditors from the
audit committee of the corporate board to the stock exchange on which the corporation is listed”
(Niskanen, 2008).
Another critic of SOX discusses the inconveniences faced by the international business
world. A contributor to The CLS Blue Sky Blog states in a piece written in February 2017, “As a
result, multinational groups listed on U.S. stock exchanges find themselves in an unenviable
position: On one hand, they are required to set up specific whistleblowing procedures in their
establishments located outside the United States, but, on the other hand, they also need to comply
with local legislation and be sensitive to cultural differences that may exist. This is no easy feat,
as there are potential conflicts between Sarbanes-Oxley and foreign law (such as EU data
protection and privacy legislation)” (Lanois, 2017). Because of the increased regulations for
public companies, many companies opted to moving to the private sector in order to avoid rules
outlined in SOX. In fact, “In 2003 and 2004, over 300 U.S. companies deregistered their
common stock for reasons other than a merger, acquisition, liquidation, registration withdrawal,
or going-private transaction. Large foreign issuers, such as Porsche of Germany and Daiwa and
Fuji Photo Film of Japan, have cited Sarbanes-Oxley’s compliance costs as their reason for
abandoning plans to list on U.S. exchanges” (Lanois, 2017).
A final critic of SOX can be found referencing reformations suggested by President
Barak Obama from 2011. Two contributors to a law forum voiced their opinions on the 15-year
anniversary of SOX being passed, “The concept of reducing regulatory barriers created by SOX
20

is buried in President Barack Obama’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness 2011 Interim
Report: ‘Regulations aimed at protecting the public from the misrepresentations of a small
number of large companies have unintentionally placed significant burdens on the large number
of smaller companies’” (Ingles and Gonzalez, 2017). The pair elaborates the business
environment for companies wanting to expand and grow has been anything but favorable
because of regulations outlined in SOX. With another reference to the 2011 Interim Report, there
is one direct proposal to amend SOX: “Amend Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) to allow shareholders of
public companies with market valuations below $1 billion to opt out of at least Section 404
compliance, if not to all of the requirements, of Sarbanes-Oxley; or, alternatively, exempt new
companies from SOX compliance for five years after they go public” (Ingles and Gonzalez,
2017). Congress has begun to explore revisions to SOX with one major push in an act called the
Financial Choice Act. Provisions within the Financial Choice Act directly aim at SOX Section
404 requirements: “The current SOX regulations exempt public companies with a market
capitalization of less than $75 million from SOX 404. The current version of the Choice Act has
raised that threshold anywhere from $250 million to $500 million” (Ingles and Gonzalez, 2017).
In conclusion, most critics agree that SOX has overstepped its boundaries and has
imposed regulations that are no longer necessary. In a current economic environment with the
U.S experiencing a decrease in big businesses establishing themselves on U.S soil, opponents
argue that altering the regulations outlined in SOX to better-suit the present business world.
However, looking at the positives which SOX brings, such as increased investor confidence and
another layer of check and balances within financial reporting, arguing against it becomes more
difficult.
4. My Opinion
After reviewing and understanding the basics of fraud, how the Enron scandal unfolded,
how the accounting world reacted to this scandal, and the positives and negatives of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a few things can be observed. With the opportunity for an
employee to commit fraud being so common from examples such as poor upper management, an
aggressive financial reporting attitude in a company, or unreliable and ineffective controls,
deregulation within the business world only fueled a fraudulent company from committing
crimes.
A question I would like to explore is who’s fault really was it: Enron’s or Arthur
Andersen’s? Analyzing the downfall of Enron because of its faulty structure and sleazy upper
management would initially lead to one concluding that it is solely Enron’s fault for its collapse.
As a public company with thousands of investors, Enron had a duty to its employees, its
shareholders, and to the business world to accurately depict its financial standings. Once its
demise became public knowledge and the SEC became involved in an investigation, all trust was
lost. Even if someone came forward with information about Enron and its financial reporting
fraud, there were little to no protection for whistleblowers, and in an international company with
large amount of pressure felt by everyone, one can only imagine the damage that could have
been done if someone did step forward. This threatening and bullying atmosphere which
encompassed Enron forced everyone to be on board, even if everyone did not agree. On the other
hand, Arthur Andersen also had a duty to Enron and to the public.
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As a public accounting company that completes audits for public companies, Andersen
had its own duties to uphold. As stated previously, auditors provide reasonable assurance that a
company’s financial statements accurately and fairly represent the company. Because Andersen
was so involved with Enron, there was barely any independence maintained which caused
collusion among the two corporations. This collusion, along with Enron being one of Andersen’s
biggest clients, created pressure to “make the numbers right” and to go with what the Enron
employees were doing instead of questioning their practices with professional skepticism.
Andersen’s kiss of death was when the firm decided to handle the SEC investigation by
shredding and deleting thousands of Enron documents and electronic documents. Although they
thought that they were getting themselves out of a hole, they were only burying themselves
deeper.
Ultimately, I believe that Andersen is more responsible for the downfall of Enron than
Enron is. Although Enron failed its duties by committing fraud years, lying to investors and to
the public, and a toxic work environment that only awarded sleazy behavior, Arthur Andersen
completely disregarded its duties as an auditor. If Andersen had done its job as an auditor and
had refused to give an opinion (disclaimer) on Enron’s financial statements because of
insufficient evidence and false information, Enron would have been the only company to fall
instead of both Enron and Andersen. Because of the actions of both Enron and Andersen, a
dramatic increase in regulations for both public companies financial reporting and for public
accounting firms.
In the early 2000s, SOX had to be created. The increase in financial statement fraud and
the lack of action from auditors gave a reason for the formation of Sarbanes-Oxley and the
PCAOB. Now, over 15 years after those frauds were committed, the business world has changed
so much. Although there is some opposition towards the PCAOB, I believe it should remain as a
checks and balances for auditors and public companies. The PCAOB has successfully grown and
adapted with the economy to guide companies towards transparency and honesty. However, I do
agree with some of the support towards repealing SOX.
Because so many public companies have now either gone private or have established
their grounds in another country in order to avoid the regulations SOX imposes, I believe that
business men and women are completely discouraged to establish themselves as an American
company. Corporations are not only avoiding establishment in the U.S because of SOX, but also
because of the decreased tax rates in most other countries. Bringing some of those big
corporations back to America may be happening soon. President Trump recently proposed
reducing the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20%. This dramatic cut will definitely entice current
and future business owners to establish themselves in America; however, the audit fees
associated with being a public company are not decreasing anytime soon. Therefore, I think the
money that would not be spent in taxes would just be spent in audit fees for public companies
moving to America, and those companies moving back to the U.S. may not be saving any
money.
In conclusion, going through a detailed description of what fraud is, how Enron fell, how
Arthur Andersen was involved, why Sarbanes-Oxley was created, and how it has impacted the
business world has allowed me to better understand the relationship between companies and their
auditors. For now, I believe that SOX has been beneficial in creating more regulations and the
PCAOB for an emphasis on transparency in financial reporting. In a speech made in September
2013 by Andrew Ceresney, Co-Director of the Division of Enforcement, he discusses the
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decrease in the number of fraud cases and financial statements being restated per year: “in
FY2012, we opened 124 financial fraud/issuer disclosure investigations compared to 304 in
FY2006 and 228 in FY2007. As for accounting fraud cases, we saw a reduction here as
well: we filed 79 financial fraud/issuer disclosure actions in FY2012 compared to 219 in
FY2007…Another trend we have seen over the last few years is a reduction in restatements. So
for example, across all public companies, restatements fell from a peak of 1,771 in 2006 to 768
in 2012” (Ceresney, 2013). Although the cost of being audited is high, receiving an unqualified
opinion from an audit firm provides investors with a confidence to continue to believe in that
company. It also provides the employees in the company to have pride for working at a company
that meets or exceeds those standards set by the SEC and the PCAOB. Public accounting firms
are working longer and harder in order to increase the efficiency in their work to drive down
their cost, but this will take time. Sarbanes-Oxley should not be repealed anytime soon; however,
Congress should continue to observe where the business world is moving to in order to properly
adapt and change with it.
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